



ONDRAF/NIRAS

Stockage géologique de déchets radioactifs en Belgique? Rôle et missions de l'ONDRAF/NIRAS

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
07/03/2019



Geological disposal of radioactive waste in Belgium – ONDRAF/NIRAS role and missions

- **General introduction to nuclear waste**
- **General introduction to Long-Term waste management**
- **Category A waste long term management**
- **Category B&C waste long term management**
- **General conclusions**

NUCLEAR Belgium in a nutshell: main nuclear sites




- SCK•CEN
- Belgonucleaire
- FBFC-I
- IRMM
- Belgoprocess
ex-Eurochemic
ex-Waste Dept.
SCK•CEN

ONDRAF is responsible for the management of all Belgian radioactive waste

SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM WASTE MANAGEMENT

1 Prevention at source



2 Identification



3 Acceptance



4 Transport



5 Processing



6 Temporary storage




LONG-TERM WASTE MANAGEMENT

7 Disposal

Surface disposal




Geological disposal



Waste acceptance

How is it done today?

1 Approval of waste processing facilities and processing methods



2 Acceptance of the waste



3 Approval of the storage buildings




Acceptance criteria
.....

Acceptance in the future

Surface disposal



Geological disposal



Acceptance criteria in the future
.....

Processing

1 Volume reduction



Combustible waste is incinerated.



Liquid waste is evaporated.



Solid waste is cut to pieces.



Drums are compressed.

2 Confinement and stabilization



The compressed waste is placed in bigger drums and immobilized in a matrix.

3 Control



The whole process is monitored.


Processing at Belgoprocess



Interim storage



Conditioned waste in interim storage



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Different waste categories → adapted long-term management solutions

A Waste : radiological impact tends towards natural level of radiation in ≈ 300 years;
Control is possible over such period of time
⇒ Keep in biosphere and thus **surface disposal** can be considered



$T < 30$ years

Short-lived waste

$T > 30$ years

Long-lived waste

Low-level waste

Medium-level waste

High-level waste

Category A

Category A

Category C

Heat emitting ↗ ↘

Category B

Category B


Category C

Thus, according to their radiological characteristics, the waste needs to be « separated » more or less from humans

B&C Waste : risk during 1 000 000 years

⇒ Safety cannot rely on humans

⇒ Need to separate from biosphere and thus **disposal at depth**



Time scales for long-term management

Different management for short- and long-lived waste

- **category A waste**

- Isolated from Man and environment for several hundreds of years

- **categories B&C waste**

- Isolated from Man and environment for ten to several hundreds of thousands of years





Figure 1. Ingestion radiotoxicity for spent LWR-UOX fuel, 51 GWd/MTIHM, normalized to natural uranium and decay products as occurs in natural uranium ore

Develop long-term disposal facilities so that its different components guarantee safety in synergy



Confinement :

- Avoid dispersion of radionuclides

Retention :

- Limit the release of radionuclides from the waste
- Limit water movement
- Retard the migration of radionuclides

Isolation :


- Separate waste from biosphere and reduce the risks and consequences of inadvertent human intrusion

On the long term, the release of radionuclides into the biosphere is sufficiently postponed so that the radiological impact has become non-significant due to radioactive decay


Geological disposal of radioactive waste in Belgium – ONDRAF/NIRAS role and missions

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Milestones in LT cat. A waste management



Milestones in LT cat. A waste management



Disposal concept: multi-barrier system

Storage building




Installation for the Production of Monoliths (IPM)




Disposal modules



Caisson plant



Monolith



Final cover: two hills 17

Overview



Caisson plant

- **Production of caissons (1000/year)**
- **Location on site**
 - Employment
 - Limitation of transport
 - Quality and delivery control




Installation for production of monoliths (IPM)

- **Concrete caissons filled with waste and grout matrix**
 - Monolith = key to safety
 - Operated by Belgoprocess
 - 1000 monoliths / year



Modules

- **Monoliths are stored in 34 concrete modules**
 - 25m x 27m x 11m > 900 monoliths each
 - Inspection area + inspection gallery
 - Protected by an insulated steel roof
 - Rail transport




Final cover

- **Steel roof will be replaced by final cover**
 - System of natural materials and foils
 - Protection against water, extreme temperatures, roots and animals
 - Decision is up to future generations



The footprint of surface disposal




Surface disposal - safety

- 1 Confine and retain
- 2 Isolate

Final cover

- Biological layer
- Sand
- Bio-intrusion barrier
- Sand
- Infiltration barrier
- Sand
- Impervious top layer



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- **Category B&C waste long term management**
- General conclusions

45 years of research

Policy steps

1980-1981

Creation of ONDRAF by Law

1989

Publication SAFIR: integration research results

2001

SAFIR 2: second integration research results

2010-2011

Public consultation in preparation to the Waste Plan

2011

Waste Plan handed over to competent authority

2014

3 June 2014: transposition European directive

Research

1974

Start of the studies at SCK•CEN

1980-1984

Construction HADES at SCK•CEN with support from EC

1987

Extension HADES

1998-2002

Second extension HADES

2007


Construction of the PRACLAY gallery

2014-2015


Start of the PRACLAY Heating Experiment

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015


Reference solution = geological disposal in clay



Geological disposal – multibarrier system




Safety concept for Category B Waste




Retardation of migration

Isolation



Time after closure of the repository
[years]


Safety concept for Category C Waste



Confinement


Retardation of migration

Isolation



Time after closure of the repository
[years]

Safety concept for Category C Waste



Confinement

Retardation of migration

Isolation

thermal phase



0 10^3 10^4 10^5 10^6

Time after closure of the repository
[years]

Safety concept, in practice (cat. C waste)

1. Confinement within the engineered barrier system (EBS)

- Supercontainer of 3 cm carbon steel, ~70 cm concrete buffer, 6 mm stainless steel envelope within grouted galleries
- Cementitious conditions (chemistry) guarantees slow corrosion of metallic barriers and confinement during at least the thermal phase



Safety concept, in practice (cat. B & cat. C)

2. Transport through the natural barrier


- Migration of radionuclides through geological barrier is **very slow** because of
 - **diffusive** transport
 - **Retention** capacity
 - **Buffer** capacity
 - homogeneous, no cracks and **self-sealing** properties
 - These properties remain over very long time periods thanks to the geological **stability** of the clay
- 40+ years of lab & in situ experiments in Boom Clay
 - **HADES URL**

Safety concept, in practice

More details on radionuclide migration in clays in upcoming presentation by Durce & Brassinnes

2. Transport through the natural barrier

- In situ diffusive transport experiment in HADES



Safety concept, in practice (cat. B & cat. C)

2. Transport through the natural barrier


- Retention capacity
 - Use of clay in medical applications and landfills to absorb heavy metals



More details on radionuclide migration in clays in upcoming presentation by Durce & Brassinnes

Safety concept, in practice (cat. B & cat. C)


3. Isolation: burial history of Boom Clay at Mol



Safety concept, in practice

4. Internal evolution

- **Clay as host rock because of favourable barrier properties**
 - Low permeability, solute diffusion, sorption, anionic excl., swelling, creep
 - In the long term, mechanically and chemically stable environment
 - Clay=dominant barrier in reference & most altered evolution scenarios
- **However, THMC perturbations of this barrier are unavoidable**




Safety concept, in practice

4. Internal evolution


More details on the THM analysis of a repository in clay host rock in upcoming presentation by Dizier & Li

Of course, perturbations interact...



Performance and safety assessment


- **Those radionuclides that succeed in migrating through the host rock are the transported into the hydrogeological system**
 - Specific R&D topics (to a significant extent, site-dependent)
- **Ultimately, some radionuclides end up into the biosphere**
 - Assessment of the potential yearly dose for an individual that lives on top of the repository and extracts its drinking and irrigation water from a well just above the clay layer



Safety assessment: typical criteria & results

Release of radionuclides into the biosphere


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Safety assessment: typical criteria & results

Release of radionuclides into the biosphere


- Assessment of the potential yearly dose for an individual that lives on top of the repository and extracts its drinking and irrigation water from a well just above the clay layer



Safety assessment: typical criteria & results

Release of radionuclides into the biosphere

- This is not a prediction, but a (very) conservative assessment that can be performed as the evolution of the system can be bound



Footprint, cost & timing (estimated) of geological disposal

Underground disposal surface \approx 5,1 km

Depth: several 100's m

Waste volume to be disposed of (inventory 2017)

Category B

\approx 4400 monoliths B

Category C

\approx 2800 supercontainers



Cost price


About 10 billion €

Start of the disposal

2050 at the earliest

Duration of the disposal operations

About 85 years



Total gallery length \approx 36 km



Conclusions

- **Gestion des déchets nucléaires en Belgique = responsabilité de l'ONDRAF**
- **cAt**
 - Licence (re-)soumise en janvier 2019
 - Exploitation prévu en 2023
 - Gestion finale connue
- **B&C**
 - Cela sera le focus du reste de la journée
 - Une large base scientifique-technologique établie pendant >40 ans sur la possibilité d'un dépôt géologique dans des argiles peu-indurées
 - Un design et un coût estimé
 - Malgré ça, pas encore de décision institutionnelle pour la gestion à long terme

Assise sociétale est essentielle. Voir aussi présentation de C. Depaus